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In order to study whether college scholarships can be an effective tool in raising students’ 
performance in secondary school, we use one aspect of the Kalamazoo Promise that resembles a 
quasi-experiment. The surprise announcement of the scholarship created a large change in 
expected college tuition costs that varied across different groups of students based on past 
enrollment decisions. This variation is arguably exogenous to unobserved student characteristics. 
We estimate the effects of this change by a set of “difference-in-differences” regressions where 
we compare the change in student outcomes in secondary school across time for different student 
“length of enrollment” groups. We find positive effects of the Kalamazoo Promise on Promise-
eligible students large enough to be deemed important—about a 9 percent increase in the 
probability of earning any credits and one less suspension day per year. We also find large 
increases in GPA among African American students.  
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The Kalamazoo Promise provides an unusual model for revitalizing an urban school 
district and its community. Announced on November 10, 2005, the Kalamazoo Promise provides 
large college scholarship benefits to graduates of Kalamazoo Public Schools (KPS), a midsized 
school district (numbering a little over 10,000 students) with a racially and economically diverse 
student population. Anonymous donors promised to pay up to 100 percent of college tuition for 
any KPS graduate attending a public college or university in Michigan. Tuition subsidies start at 
65 percent of college tuition for students enrolling in KPS from 9th grade, and gradually increase 
to 100 percent for students attending since kindergarten. The scholarship does not require any 
minimum high school grade point average (GPA) or financial need. Students must simply get 
into college and maintain a 2.0 college GPA. In sum, the Kalamazoo Promise is unusual among 
scholarship programs in its universality and generosity. 
The Promise, as it is called, has attracted much attention and many imitators. In 2008, the 
Economist ran a piece on the scholarship (“A Promising Future” [Economist 2008]). In part 
because of the Promise, in 2010, President Obama gave the commencement address to the 
graduating class of Kalamazoo Central High School. At least 24 areas around the country have 
started or are trying to start Promise-style programs, with private or public funding.1  
The tuition subsidies of the Promise provide incentives for higher academic output. 
Students who otherwise might choose to attend the state university located in Kalamazoo, 
Western Michigan University (WMU), may use the tuition subsidy to attend higher-ranked state 
universities such as Michigan State University or the University of Michigan. Students who 
                                                 
1 See http://www.upjohn.org/promise/promisescholarships.html for a list of such programs (accessed 
August 17, 2012).  
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otherwise would have attended the local community college may use the subsidy to attend 
WMU.2 Students who without the Promise might not have attended college may use the subsidy 
to go to a community college. Admission to and graduation from more demanding colleges 
requires students to have better academic performance.  
Our paper estimates the effects of the Kalamazoo Promise on student achievement and 
behavior. We use one aspect of the Promise that bears resemblance to a “quasi-experiment.” The 
surprise 2005 announcement of the Kalamazoo Promise created a large change in college tuition 
costs that varied across different groups of students based on prior enrollment decisions. The 
morning after the Promise was announced, some KPS students found themselves to be eligible 
for a 100 percent tuition subsidy, others for a smaller tuition subsidy, while still others could 
expect to receive no scholarship. The tuition subsidy depended upon how long the student had 
been enrolled in KPS. That enrollment decision, however, had been made without knowledge of 
the Promise. This variation across student groups in the surprise change in college tuition costs is 
arguably exogenous to unobserved student characteristics. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that 
changes in student achievement and behavior that are statistically linked to such exogenous 
tuition changes can be interpreted as program effects. We estimate this effect by estimating a 
difference-in-differences regression where we compare the change in student outcomes across 
time for different “length of enrollment” groups. This procedure controls for unobserved 
differences between students who started their enrollment in KPS at different grades.  
This quasi-experimental investigation is needed because there is theoretical uncertainty 
about the magnitude and sign of the Promise’s effects on student behavior and achievement. On 
the one hand, the Promise relaxes credit constraints of attending any public college in Michigan 
                                                 
2 For empirical evidence of such a shift in the choice set of colleges following the Promise, see Andrews, 
DesJardins, and Ranchhod (2010).  
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and lowers the relative cost of selective state universities, which may spur the students to exert 
additional effort. On the other hand, the Promise may diminish the value of merit-based 
scholarships, leading the students to exert less effort. Furthermore, for students from 
disadvantaged families, the net benefit of the Promise may be small, as they are eligible for need-
based financial aid. (However, many may not be fully aware of this eligibility). Some high 
school students may not respond to the Promise because they do not understand the mapping 
between education inputs and outputs. Other students may not respond to the Promise because its 
benefits are too delayed and uncertain.  In sum, the Promise’s impact on student outcomes is an 
empirical question.  
Our analysis finds that the Kalamazoo Promise has statistically and substantively 
significant effects in improving student achievement levels and behavior. For the overall sample, 
we estimate a decrease in the number of days spent in suspension by one or two days per school 
year, which is large compared to sample means and standard deviations. For the overall sample, 
we do not find effects on high school GPA. When confronted with incentives generated by the 
Promise, students are more likely to react along a margin they perceive that they can control, 
such as improving their behavior. On the other hand, for African American students, we estimate 
a dramatic increase in GPA, ranging from about 0.17 standard deviations to about 0.60. For these 
students, whose baseline achievement and behavior indicators lag white students, the decrease in 
the number of days spent in suspension appears to spill over into a higher GPA. We speculate 
that this could be due to the number of days in suspension exceeding a “tipping point” beyond 
which GPA increases by the virtue of students being present in the classroom for some critical 
number of days. Finally, our estimated effects are only apparent when the analysis controls for 
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student “fixed effects”—that is, when it actually considers differences in behavior of the same 
student before and after the Promise announcement.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section discusses 
related previous research literature, including research on the effects of student financial 
incentives on student achievement and behavior and research on effects of the Kalamazoo 
Promise. The next section provides further background information on the KPS district and the 
Kalamazoo Promise. We then describe the data we use, as well as the econometric models we 
use to analyze the data, and then describe the results. The final section concludes.  
RELATED LITERATURE 
Relevant research to this paper includes studies of how financial incentives affect student 
achievement and behavior, and how the Promise has affected students, the school district, and 
the Kalamazoo area. 
Several recent studies have examined how financial incentives affect student achievement 
and behavior. Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton (2009) study the effects of a merit-based 
randomized scholarship program for girls in primary schools in Kenya. The evaluation of the 
scholarship, which was implemented as a randomized experiment at the school level, provided 
the winning 6th grade girls with an award for the next two academic years. The authors find that 
the scholarships increased performance by 0.09–0.14 standard deviations. Interestingly, the 
authors find positive externalities for boys, who were not entitled to the scholarship, and for girls 
who had a relatively low probability of winning the scholarship.   
Dhiraj Sharma (2010) studies the impact of a randomized cash rewards program among 
Nepalese 8th graders. Similar to Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton (2009), the randomization was 
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conducted across schools. The cash rewards were based on total scores on exams. Sharma finds 
that the financial impact of these incentives equaled about a 0.09 standard deviation gain in 
aggregate scores. 
A related strand of research looks at vouchers. Angrist et al. (2002) and Angrist, 
Bettinger, and Kremer (2006) study the randomly distributed vouchers in Colombia that partially 
covered the cost of private secondary school for students who maintained satisfactory academic 
progress. The authors find that, three years after the lotteries, the winners of the vouchers were 
about 10 percent more likely to have finished 8th grade and scored about 0.2 standard deviations 
higher on achievement tests.  
Some research examines student incentive effects in developed economies. Angrist and 
Lavy (2009) look at the effects of a cash rewards experiment on graduating from Israeli high 
schools. The authors find strong effects among high-ability women. Angrist, Lang, and 
Oreopoulos (2009) study the effects of merit-based scholarships on students who are solid 
performers, but not top-ranked, among entering first-year undergraduates at a large Canadian 
university. They too find strong effects for women, but none for men. In a similar study, Leuven, 
Oosterbeek, and van der Klaauw (2010) conduct a randomized experiment among first-year 
undergraduate students at the University of Amsterdam. The experiment provides a cash reward 
for those students who completed all of their first-year requirements by the start of the next 
academic year. They find that rewards matter only for high-ability groups.  
The aforementioned studies deal with incentives related to academic output—
performance on tests, grades, or fulfilling certain requirements. Standard agency theory suggests 
that if we want to incentivize a student to exert effort, and we do not observe it perfectly, the 
optimal contract should be conditional on output. However, this result fails if students do not 
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understand the mapping between educational inputs and outputs. Fryer (2011) has studied this 
issue in experiments on what incentives work best in urban schools. Based on randomized 
experiments  in New York City, Dallas, Chicago, and Washington, D.C., Fryer concludes that 
incentives tied to output (e.g., being paid to do well on a test) are not as effective as those tied to 
inputs (e.g., being paid to read a book).3  
In the case of the Promise, the program provides complex and contradictory incentives 
for changes in student behavior and achievement, which may in turn be only partly understood 
by students. As mentioned above, the program provides some incentive for students to improve 
high school behavior and achievement in order to be admitted to and succeed at more selective 
postsecondary institutions. However, as Fryer’s (2011) work underlines, students may not fully 
understand what behavior needs to change or how to alter it.  
The Promise may also lower the value of merit-based scholarships.  However, many 
students may not fully understand what is required for merit-based scholarships, or the Promise’s 
effects on such scholarships. For low-income students, the Promise may in many cases simply 
replace institutional or government need-based aid. However, both the need-based aid system 
and eligibility requirements may be unclear for low-income students. In addition, from the 
perspective of the students, the tuition subsidies of the Promise might be too delayed and too 
uncertain.4 For example, Levitt et al. (2012) argue that financial incentives are less potent if they 
are handed out with a delay. Finally, if high school students do not understand the mapping 
                                                 
3 Fryer (2011) is, however, cautious in interpreting his findings as a panacea and points out the need to 
understand the relationship between inputs in the education production function. If there are important 
complementarities between various inputs, then conditioning rewards on one input may prove ineffective. 
4 The anonymous donors have stated their intention for the program to continue indefinitely and have 
guaranteed that if the program ever ends, all students enrolled in KPS at that time would receive the scholarship. 
However, we cannot rule out that students are still uncertain about receiving the Promise.  
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between educational inputs and outputs, then the benefits of a college scholarship might appear 
too abstract to alter any behavior.  
Although there have been no in-depth studies of whether the Promise has changed 
student behavior, other aspects of the Kalamazoo Promise program have been analyzed (see, for 
example, Miller-Adams [2009]). Bartik, Eberts, and Huang (2010) find a dramatic post-Promise 
increase in enrollment. Furthermore, after decades of shrinking enrollment among white 
students, the Promise has led to a stabilization of KPS’s racial makeup. These enrollment effects 
are due to a one-year increase in the entry rate to KPS, in the year after the Promise, 
accompanied by a permanent decrease in the exit rate, with these patterns occurring for all ethnic 
groups. These entry rate and exit rate effects are consistent with the Promise making KPS 
significantly more attractive to students. Bartik, Eberts, and Huang also find evidence that since 
the Promise, KPS test scores have increased somewhat faster than in similar Michigan school 
districts. 
These results are further corroborated by Miller (2010), who also looks at the reaction of 
the real estate market. One purpose of the Promise is to promote the Kalamazoo area’s economic 
development. These economic development effects could occur because Kalamazoo now seems 
attractive to parents and businesses. Miller (2010) addresses these issues by studying whether the 
effects of the scholarship have been capitalized by the real estate market. Using a difference-in-
differences design, Miller (2010) does not find positive effects of the Promise on housing prices, 
but does find that the Promise has had positive effects on student culture, for example, by 
improving school safety.   
Andrews, DesJardins, and Ranchhod (2010) use a difference-in-differences method to 
study the effects of the Kalamazoo Promise on college choice. Using proprietary data from the 
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ACT Student Profile Questionnaire, they estimate the effect of the Promise on the test takers’ 
intended college choice set. Using other public high schools in the state of Michigan as a control 
group, the authors find large effects of the Promise on college choice, especially for students 
who are economically disadvantaged. The Promise increases student interest in all Michigan 
public colleges and universities, with particularly strong effects on student interest in the flagship 
schools—the University of Michigan and Michigan State University. Therefore, this study 
provides some evidence that the Promise increases student interest in more selective universities, 
which will require higher student achievement during high school.  
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE KALAMAZOO PUBLIC SCHOOL 
SYSTEM AND THE KALAMAZOO PROMISE  
Kalamazoo Public Schools is a midsized, predominantly urban school system. As Figures 
1 and 2 show, before the Kalamazoo Promise, enrollment had been declining for many years. 
This partially reflects relatively modest economic growth in Michigan and Kalamazoo. In 
addition, it reflects Kalamazoo’s status as a district centered in a core city (although also 
including some nearby suburban and rural areas) that has more intense social and economic 
problems than its surrounding metropolitan areas. For example, family poverty rates as of the 
2000 census were 13.6 percent in the city of Kalamazoo and 6.5 percent in all of Kalamazoo 
County.  
Even before the Promise, the Kalamazoo school district had a considerable portion of 
poor students from a wide variety of ethnic groups. Figure 3 shows trends in the number of 
black, Hispanic, and non-Hispanic white students in the district. As can be seen in the figure, 
although KPS retained a considerable percentage of white students and students who did not 
qualify for free and reduced price lunches, the percentage of students in these two groups was 
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clearly falling. Since the advent of the Kalamazoo Promise, enrollment in KPS has been on the 
rise. Furthermore, enrollment seems to be up proportionately for all ethnic groups, so the ethnic 
percentages have stabilized (Figure 3). These patterns are consistent with a Promise effect.  
The Kalamazoo Promise 
According to information provided by the school district, the anonymous donors believe 
that the purpose of the Promise is to promote economic and community development, in part by 
attracting parents and businesses to the Kalamazoo area; to boost educational achievement and 
attainment; and to help increase confidence in KPS.  
The Kalamazoo Promise is available to all students who graduate from KPS, reside in the 
district, and have been KPS students for four years or longer.5 The scholarship covers up to 100 
percent of all tuition and mandatory fees for up to four years and must be used within 10 years of 
high school graduation. The benefit is graduated based on the length of attendance in the KPS 
system. Figure 4 traces the relation between grade-level enrollment in KPS and the expected 
fraction of tuition and fees covered if the student graduates from KPS.  
Between grades 3 and 9, there is a 5 percent decrement in the generosity of the 
scholarship for each additional year of postponing enrollment in KPS. The biggest discrete drop-
off in generosity occurs between enrolling in 9th grade (65 percent) and 10th grade or later (0 
percent). A student entering KPS in grade 10 or afterward is ineligible for Promise tuition 
benefits.  
The requirement of the scholarship is that enrollment and residency must be continuous. 
For example, suppose a student started in KPS in kindergarten. If that student stays in KPS until 
                                                 
5 This information comes from the Kalamazoo Promise Web site: 
http://kalamazoopromise.com/uploaded/Promise%20Senior%20Information%20Brochure.pdf (accessed August 17, 
2012). 
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graduation, she is eligible for a 100 percent Promise tuition subsidy. If that student instead 
switches to another district in 5th grade and later reenrolls in KPS in 9th grade, she will only be 
eligible for a 65 percent Promise tuition subsidy.  
Other than date of continuous enrollment, no other aspect of a student’s K–12 experience 
or family background directly affects eligibility. Students do not have to demonstrate financial 
need, maintain any minimum GPA in high school, or take any particular mix of courses. They 
do, of course, do need to be admitted to a college to receive Promise benefits.  
The scholarship applies to students who are admitted to and enrolled at any public 
university or community college in the state of Michigan. The students must be full time (taking 
12 credit hours per semester at a minimum) and maintain a 2.0 GPA in college. Students who fall 
below a 2.0 GPA can become eligible again for the Promise if they continue attending college on 
their own dime (or their family’s) and then succeed in increasing their cumulative GPA above 
the 2.0 college GPA requirement.  
Students are eligible for Promise benefits for up to 130 credits of undergraduate college 
or university education. As stated above, this eligibility extends for up to 10 years after high 
school graduation. The Promise’s benefits can be applied to certificate programs at community 
colleges, not just programs leading to an associate or bachelor degree.  
To gain an appreciation of the value of the Kalamazoo Promise, we calculate a “back-of-
the-envelope” estimate of the discounted present value of the scholarship. Our calculations use 
information about enrollment decisions of the first cohort of Kalamazoo Promise recipients. 
About 45 percent of new enrollees in 2006 attended a community college (almost all of them 
attended the local Kalamazoo Valley Community College). The remainder, 181 students, 
enrolled in public universities, of which the majority enrolled at Western Michigan University 
11 
(101 students), followed by Michigan State University (37), and University of Michigan (17). 
We assume that these college-going probabilities remain constant over time and across different 
tuition subsidy groups.6 In Table 1, we calculate a present value of the Promise for different 
subsidy groups. Our calculations indicate that for someone eligible for a 100 percent tuition 
subsidy, the present value is about $27,413, while for someone who is eligible for a 65 percent 
subsidy, the present value is about $17,818.  
Take-up of the Kalamazoo Promise and Variation in Eligibility  
The Kalamazoo Promise has been widely used among KPS graduates. As Table 2 shows, 
in the various graduation years, 80–90 percent of KPS graduates have been eligible for at least 
some Promise benefits. Of those eligible, between 82 and 85 percent at some point have used 
Promise benefits.  
There is wide variation in the Promise subsidy across KPS students.  As shown in Table 
3, among KPS graduates, the largest group is those eligible for a 100 percent tuition subsidy 
(attended KPS since kindergarten).  However, there are also large numbers ineligible for a 
subsidy (last entered KPS after 9th grade), eligible for a 65 percent tuition subsidy (entered KPS 
at 9th grade), and eligible for a 95 percent subsidy (entered KPS at first, second, or third grade).7  
                                                 
6 In fact, the Kalamazoo Promise has altered these probabilities. Our aim with this calculation is for 
illustrative purposes only. In column (2) of Table 1, we lower the probability of going to a community college to 
0.30. Since the likelihood of attending a four-year college correlates with family background, such weights might 
better reflect preferences of high-income families. This reweighting increases the present value of the scholarship, 
holding other parameters constant. For an in-depth study on how the Kalamazoo Promise altered the college choice 
set across time and different income groups, see Andrews, DesJardins, and Ranchhod (2010).  
7 Anecdotally, we know that many of those who enter KPS at 9th grade have previously been students who attended 
private or charter schools from kindergarten through 8th grade. Many private and charter schools in the Kalamazoo 
area do not include high school, perhaps because of the larger costs per student that are characteristic of high school. 
We therefore might expect some differences in academic performance between students entering at 9th grade and 
students entering at other grade levels.  
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DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
Our data come from KPS administrative records. In our analysis, we focus on students in 
grades 9–12. We chose this focus for several reasons. First, it allows the analysis to include some 
students who end up being ineligible for the Promise because they entered after 9th grade. 
Obviously, all students in earlier grades are potentially eligible for at least a 65 percent tuition 
subsidy. Second, for high school students as opposed to younger students, the tuition subsidy 
benefits of the Kalamazoo Promise are closer in time. Third, high school students are more likely 
than students in earlier grades to believe that their achievement and behavior in school will affect 
admission prospects at more selective colleges.  
Our regression sample consists of 9th–12th graders from the school years 2003–04 to 
2007–08. Our “window of observation” thus consists of two pre-Promise years, the year the 
Promise scholarship was announced, and two post-Promise school years. Because our enrollment 
data go back to 1997–98, we consistently track enrollment histories for everyone since 6th grade. 
Our data set is an unbalanced panel—students are in the panel for various lengths of time, 
depending upon what grade they started in and how long they stayed in KPS. We have data on 
student characteristics, grade-point averages, types of courses taken, and disciplinary actions. 
The disciplinary data consist of information on days of suspension and detention.  
We use our data to calculate for each student what his or her Promise subsidy would have 
been had the Promise been in effect for that year and had the student continued attending KPS 
until graduation. We call this the student’s “virtual Promise benefit.” Our hypothesis  is  that for 
every time period, students are forward-looking and adjust their behavior as a function of the 
expected generosity of the Promise, given that they maintain a continuous enrollment in KPS, 
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graduate, and enter a public college or university in Michigan. Our interest lies in estimating how 
the variation in this perceived future tuition subsidy at the time of observation affects 
achievement and behavior. Throughout our analysis, we therefore focus on these virtual Promise 
benefits (as opposed to the levels of tuition subsidy at the time of graduation), since they capture 
a shock to the expectations of the student following the announcement of the scholarship.  
For school years 2003–04 and 2004–05, these “virtual Promise benefits” are virtual in the 
sense that the student was unaware of them, as the Promise was not announced until November 
2005. Therefore, we would assume that any effect of this simulated Promise benefit in those 
years reflects effects that are associated with what grade the student entered KPS, rather than the 
effect of a Promise benefit of which the student had no knowledge.  
Including 2003–04 as an additional control year allows us to see the extent to which 
results jump around during the pre-Promise years. If there are big changes across these two pre-
Promise years in student achievement and behavior for students with different enrollment 
histories in KPS, and hence different virtual Promise eligibility, then there is some question 
about whether any differences between pre- and post-Promise years are actually due to the 
Promise. 
On November 10, 2005, students became aware of the potential Promise benefits that 
would accrue to them given their enrollment in KPS to date. This allows some effect of Promise 
benefits on student achievement and behavior after that date. However, it would be reasonable to 
assume that there might be some lag time before students fully understood and acted on the 
incentives of the Promise. By November 2005, students had already made certain decisions 
about that academic year, such as what courses to enroll in for the fall of 2005. The school year 
2006–07 is a full post-Promise year. By fall 2006, students may more fully understand what the 
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Promise might mean for their future. Including the 2007–08 school year adds a second full post-
Promise year to help confirm effects estimated for the 2006–07 year.  
Restricting the analysis to these five years limits the extent to which other changes in 
KPS’s policies and practices might differentially affect “length of enrollment” groups, which 
may differ in unobserved characteristics. Furthermore, in controlling for student fixed effects, we 
must restrict our attention to years close to the Promise to have students whose high school 
careers comprise the years both before and after the advent of the Promise.  
Methods 
Estimating the effects of the Kalamazoo Promise program is challenging. A key problem 
is the difficulty in identifying suitable comparison groups. For example, consider comparing a 
district with a Promise-style program with a district that lacks such a program. The 
achievement/behavior levels and trends in the Promise district could be due to either the Promise 
or other differences in the two school districts. One promising approach would be to use panel 
data for both the Promise and the non-Promise district and conduct a difference-in-differences 
analysis. Currently we do not have access to microdata from other non-Promise districts, which 
means our analysis must be restricted to the KPS district.  
We can derive one possible comparison group within KPS by using variation in Promise 
eligibility stemming from differences in pre-Promise enrollment decisions. Because the 
announcement of the Promise in November 2005 was a surprise, families did not choose the 
timing of enrollment of their children in KPS in anticipation of the possibility of coverage by a 
universal scholarship program. Thus, some children already enrolled in KPS found themselves to 
be eligible for 100 percent tuition, some for 65 percent tuition, while others could expect to 
receive no tuition subsidy at all. This unanticipated and exogenous variation in the eligibility for 
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a college scholarship provides an opportunity to infer the causal impact of the Promise on 
student outcomes and behavior.  
This differential change in tuition scholarships can be seen as a natural experiment: an 
exogenous change in policy assigns certain individuals to a “treatment,” whereas other 
individuals are not affected (the “controls”). However, because it is a natural experiment, this 
differential change in tuition scholarship is not randomly assigned, but rather depends on pre-
Promise enrollment decisions.  
Because students enrolled in different grades will differ in their behavioral and 
achievement levels, it would be misleading to use a simple comparison of achievement levels 
between eligible and ineligible students to estimate the Promise’s effects. There is no reason to 
think that students not eligible for Promise benefits because they enrolled in 10th grade or later 
will on average be similar in academic achievement or behavior to students eligible for various 
Promise tuition subsidies. By simultaneously focusing on not only changes over time but also 
differences across eligibility groups, we end up with comparisons that more plausibly represent 
Promise effects. In order to address concerns of bias due to systematic pre-Promise differences 
between groups of students that enrolled in KPS in 9th grade as  opposed to, say, kindergarten, 
we conduct our long-term analysis in regression-adjusted difference-in-differences framework 
where, for the pre-Promise school years, we calculate the virtual benefit as if the Promise were in 
effect during those years. Hence, we treat the ineligible students as our control group.  
This approach, however, has an important caveat, namely, that it is probable that the 
group of students entitled to zero benefits from the Promise is also affected by the Promise. Such 
Promise effects on ineligible students could be due to peer effects, or effects from school climate 
or policy changes induced by the Promise. If even this “zero eligibility” group has been affected 
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by the Promise, our estimated effects by comparing eligible versus ineligible students will 
understate the Promise’s full effects.  
Equation (1) provides a formal framework for evaluating the effects of the Promise on 
student achievement. First, consider the following regression: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜑𝐼{𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 > 0}𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑡𝑇𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑡  (𝑇𝑡 × 𝐼{𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 > 0}𝑖)𝑡 +  𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  (1) 
The indicator function I{Benefit > 0} equals 1 if the student i would be eligible for any tuition 
subsidy from the Promise scholarship (65 percent or more), given that he or she continues 
attending KPS until graduation. This dummy captures any fixed differences between the group 
eligible for the Promise and the group not eligible. The time effects T control for the way the 
outcome variable of interest is influenced over time. We regress outcome y on this indicator 
function, the time effects, and an interaction term between Promise indicator and time effects. In 
our regressions, we choose the “zero eligibility” category and the immediate year preceding the 
announcement of the Promise (2004–05) as our omitted reference categories. The rationale for 
the Promise eligibility dummy is that Promise eligibility versus no Promise eligibility may be 
more salient for most students and their families, and that we might get somewhat more precise 
and informative estimates by simply looking at the average effects of any Promise eligibility. The 
coefficients on the T × I{Benefit > 0} interactions are the differences between the pre- and post-
Promise outcomes for the two groups determined by the generosity of the Promise formula.  
The identifying assumption of model (1) is that the T × I{Benefit > 0} interaction terms 
are orthogonal to the error term uit. We believe this untestable assumption to be plausible, as the 
fraction of the tuition covered by the Promise is a function of past decisions that were not made 
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in anticipation of the announcement of the scholarship. If this assumption holds, the estimated γ’s 
will represent the effects of scholarship eligibility on outcomes.8  
Although the eligibility for the different levels of the KPS dummies ought to be 
orthogonal to student characteristics at the time of the announcement, in order to increase the 
precision of the estimate we also include observable characteristics of the students, denoted by 
the vector x, such as gender, race, grade level, and free and reduced price lunch status.  
As with virtually any educational policy analysis, it is impossible in principle to exclude 
student fixed effects on student educational achievement and behavior. Prior research suggests 
that such student effects may be large. However, here the relevant issue is whether we need to 
control for student effects—e.g., to condition on these effects and thereby treat them as fixed, in 
order to get unbiased estimates of Promise effects. We will need to control for student effects as 
fixed effects if such student fixed effects are correlated with the T × I{Benefit >0} interaction 
terms. The student fixed effects will be correlated with year dummy × Promise eligibility 
interaction terms when there is differential migration of different Promise eligibility groups into 
or out of the KPS school district after the Promise. For example, we could imagine that some 
families with “better students”—in part, “better” for reasons that are unobserved—may be less 
likely to move students with zero eligibility out of KPS because of the Promise. This might occur 
if such students also have younger siblings who are eligible for the Promise. To control for such 
possible biases, we replace α in Equation (1) with αi.  
As stated earlier, our data set is an unbalanced panel, where we observe new students 
entering as well as established students leaving the school district. There is little concern that, 
before the announcement of the Promise, this in- and out-migration would be systematic with 
                                                 
8 In this specification we cannot assume the uit to be independent over time; hence we compute individual 
cluster-robust standard errors. 
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respect to anticipation of a universal scholarship. However, in the post-Promise years, students 
have an incentive to enroll in KPS. Because this post-Promise sorting is endogenous, we exclude 
all the new students who enrolled in 9th grade after November 10, 2005 (as these students are 
entitled to 65 percent of tuition covered if they stay enrolled). We allow for new entrants in 
grades 10–12, as they are entitled to zero coverage and have no financial incentives to enroll in 
KPS because of the Promise. Nevertheless, in order to be prudent about maintaining the 
exogenous nature of how the Promise assigns the different levels of generosity, we conduct a 
robustness check by excluding these observations. This turns out not to matter much for our main 
results, though for some results it leads the point estimate losing some of its precision.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the sample. We pooled the years together into 
“before” (2003–04 and 2004–05) and “after” (2005–06 until 2007–08) periods, which separated 
whether the student is eligible for any or no future tuition subsidy (“Benefit > 0” and “No 
benefit”). We report the sample means, the standard deviations (although not for proportions), 
and the number of observations (that is, the number of student-year cells).   
As can be seen from the demographic data, the student population of KPS over this time 
is certainly diverse. Many disadvantaged students are included, as well as many racial minorities, 
but there are also many white students and nondisadvantaged students. We notice several 
differences between the groups that were eligible for some future tuition subsidy and those that 
were not. Before the announcement of the Promise, the recent enrollees—entitled to no future 
tuition subsidy—were more likely to be African Americans and beneficiaries of free and reduced 
price lunch.  
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As our dependent variable, we use several different metrics. For each student and year, 
we compute GPA. We assign A to equal 4, B to equal 3, C to equal 2, D to equal 1, and F to 
equal zero. We obtain the incidence of suspension and the number of days within the school year 
spent in suspension. We also collect data on the incidence of in-school suspension and look at 
the effects of the Promise on credits earned.9  
In KPS, students also participate in a credit recovery program, which allows them to 
accumulate more credits than the normal eight per school year. (There are normally eight credits 
per school year.  KPS during this time was on a block schedule, in which students normally took 
four courses, at one credit per course, each semester. Each course was counted as if it were 
equivalent to a full year of a course under the previous six-period day.) We top-code the 
maximum number of credits earned at 12. This procedure affects 59 observations.  
Student achievement using our measures is relatively low: GPAs are low, and we record 
a low mean number of credits obtained per year (out of 8 possible). There is certainly plenty of 
scope for a Kalamazoo Promise program to improve student achievement in high school.  
Using GPA as a measure of achievement raises some concerns about whether changes in 
teacher behavior might drive any results—have teachers, for example, become more lenient 
following the announcement of the Promise? As long as any such changes in the school 
environment are uniformly affecting students, their impact is controlled for by the time fixed 
effects T in Equation (1). A potential pitfall for our empirical strategy would be if, post-Promise, 
teachers systematically graded a given eligible student (as we control for fixed effects) 
differently from a student who is not eligible. We deem this rather unlikely. However, in such 
cases, one would like to conduct the analysis using more standardized measures of high school 
                                                 
9 We have also looked at the impact on the number of attempted advanced-placement (AP) credits. AP 
classes are intended to offer material at a similar level to undergraduate courses in college. KPS displays relatively 
low levels of enrollment in AP courses and of students obtaining AP credits.  
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achievement, such as the Michigan Educational Assessment Program test (MEAP).10 
Unfortunately, the MEAPs are only comparable since the fall of 2005, just about the time when 
the Kalamazoo Promise was announced. Thus, we cannot control for pre-Promise trends, which 
turn out to be important.  
There also is considerable scope for student behavior to improve. A large proportion of 
students were suspended or detained each year, and the figure for mean days of detention and 
suspension (which includes those students who had zero days for the year) is large enough that 
we certainly could imagine some significant reduction in these indicators of poor behavior.  
Table 4 shows that some 9th graders are not eligible for the Promise. In those cases, the 
student had enrolled after the state school fall census date, and according to conversations with 
the administrators of the scholarship, the enrollment of such a student counts as if the student had 
enrolled in 10th grade. Finally, we see a decline in the fraction of students eligible for 65 percent 
or more of the future tuition subsidy. This happens because we drop all of the new students 
entering 9th grade after November 10, 2005.  
RESULTS 
Main Results 
Table 5 shows results for academic achievement dependent variables, and Table 6 shows 
results for behavioral dependent variables.  The omitted dummies are the immediate pre-Promise 
year of 2004–05 and the zero benefit category.  
We do not report coefficients on other controls, which are included in these 
specifications. These other variables include controls for grade level, gender, and race/ethnic 
                                                 
10 The MEAP is a standardized test used by the state of Michigan for No Child Left Behind accountability. 
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group (white, black, Hispanic) and a dummy, which indicates whether there is variation in the 
benefit across time after school year 2005–06 within students and any new enrollees post-2005–
06. Obviously, these controls are eliminated when we include student fixed effects. The fixed 
effect regressions do control for free and reduced price lunch status, which is a time-varying 
variable.  
Our focus is on the estimated effects of the Promise benefit categories interacted with the 
dummy for the year 2005–06 (the year of the announcement) and for 2006–07 and 2007–08, the 
post-Promise years. These interacted effects are relative to the effect for the zero-benefit 
category in the school year 2004–05. For the fixed-effect regressions, these estimated effects also 
control for the student’s performance or behavior in other years. In other words, we look at 
whether students in the various Promise benefit categories differentially changed in the years 
following the announcement relative to their own history, and then compare these findings to 
what happened to students in the zero-benefit category.  
As the tables show, in the regressions without fixed effects, Promise eligibility frequently 
has the unexpected sign, and it is sometimes statistically significant and negative. For example, 
without student fixed effects, students entitled to any Promise tuition subsidy are estimated to 
have a statistically significantly reduced GPA. 
In contrast, results are more often of the expected sign and statistically significant when 
we control for student fixed effects. In particular, we find evidence that Promise eligibility had 
positive effects on GPA, although this effect is not precisely estimated.  
A similar pattern emerges in columns (3) through (6) of Tables 5 and 6: simple Ordinary 
Least Squares suggests a decrease (although not statistically significant), whereas controlling for 
individual student fixed effects reverses the sign on the coefficient.  
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The bottom rows of Tables 5 and 6 provide another way of ascertaining the size of the 
estimated effects of the Kalamazoo Promise benefits on student achievement and behavior in the 
years following the Promise. As is often done in educational research, we compute the “effect 
size” of this policy for the dependent variables that are continuous. This simply rescales the 
estimated effects by the standard deviation of these variables across individual students in some 
control group, which in this case is taken to be the standard deviation across individual students 
in the pre-Promise year of 2004–05. For the GPA, credits earned, and days suspended, the 
estimated effect sizes are about 0.1σ–0.16σ in absolute magnitude, which represent effect sizes 
that are typical of many educational interventions.11 
The average number of days of out-of-school suspension declined for Promise 
beneficiaries in 2006–07, compared to nonbeneficiaries, by a little over one day per school year. 
This is averaged across all students, including the approximately 80 percent of all students who 
received no out-of-school suspensions, and is large compared to average number of days 
suspended over all students of about two days. We see that this effect is even more pronounced 
in the school year 2007–08, with a decline of about two days.  
As Tables 5 and 6 show, results differ considerably when controlling for individual 
student fixed effects. This implies that individual student fixed effects and their trends over time 
must be correlated with the interactions between year dummies and benefit categories.12 These 
differential time trends are consistent with the absence of controls for fixed effects leading to the 
“wrong” sign for Promise benefits in the post-Promise year. Because fixed effects are the same 
                                                 
11 Bloom, Hill, and Lipsey (2008) discuss magnitude of effect sizes across different grades. It is known that 
learning gains are typically greatest between kindergarten and 1st grade, ranging sometimes in effect sizes larger 
than one standard deviation. The learning gains in later grades are typically much smaller. This in turn implies that 
an effect size of an intervention of 0.1σ in high school is a more pronounced impact than a 0.1σ in kindergarten.  
12 In an appendix, available upon request, we present some figures showing trends in average fixed effects 
over time for different benefit categories. 
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for all students who remain in the sample over time, these trends reflect differences in the 
students moving into or out of KPS during that period. For the zero benefit group, this out-
migration and in-migration has tended to lead to higher student fixed effects of the students that 
remain, whereas for the students in the positive benefit categories this is not as true. The causes 
of this differential migration form an interesting topic that we hope to explore in future research. 
Multiyear difference-in-differences analysis can be represented in a graph and enable 
detection of existing preintervention group × time trends. The idea is that if our estimation 
procedure is sound, we would not see any significant effects for Promise-eligible groups versus 
non-Promise-eligible groups in the years preceding the announcement of the Promise. This is a 
type of falsification test for our model.  
The various panels of Figures 5 and 6 plot the difference-in-differences point estimates 
from the fixed-effects regressions, along with 90 percent confidence intervals, across the pre- 
and post-Promise years. Recall that 2005–06 was only a partial Promise year, as the Promise was 
announced in November of 2005. We might expect effects in this first Promise year to be 
smaller, as it may take some time for students, parents, and teachers to make much of a 
substantial adjustment to the incentives provided by the Promise. In general, the effects are 
statistically insignificant for 2005–06.  
Panel A of Figure 5 shows the difference-in-differences point estimates for GPA from 
column (1) in Table 5. It is clear from the plot that the estimate seems driven by a preexisting 
trend. In addition, the post-Promise point calculation is estimated imprecisely. Therefore, it is 
hard to argue that there is any convincing evidence of a causal effect of the Promise on GPA. As 
a robustness check, we have also grouped students based on whether they are eligible for a 65 
percent tuition subsidy or a subsidy that is 80 percent or more. Our rationale for this exercise has 
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been that for both these groups of eligible students, teachers might be even less certain about 
eligibility levels. The findings for GPA are very similar to the trend displayed in Panel A of 
Figure 5.13 
Turning to Panels B and C, which plot the effect on credits earned and whether the 
student earned any credits (i.e., the point estimates from columns [8] and [10] in Table 5), we 
observe that following 2005–06, any preexisting group × year trend appears to have been 
reversed. The point estimate in the school year 2007–08 suggests that the probability of earning 
any credits is about 8.8 percent higher for students eligible for some future tuition subsidy. This 
latter point estimate is significant at the 5 percent level.  
Figure 6 plots the point estimates from Table 6. The results are clear: there are no 
statistically significant differences in the pre-Promise effects. In addition, the point estimates in 
2003–04 in Panel A through Panel D are approximately zero. Following the Promise, days spent 
in suspension decrease during the school year 2005–06 and continue to decrease.  
Table 4 shows that the distribution of days spent in suspension and detention is quite 
skewed—as most students are not suspended or detained, there is a large cluster of zeros. In 
order to determine whether the effect on total days suspended or in detention is driven by the 
extensive margin, we also plot the point estimates of the effect of the Promise on the probability 
of being suspended or assigned detention. The point estimate on the probability of being 
suspended is imprecise but also suggests a decrease; see Panel B of Figure 6. This implies that 
                                                 
13 We observe a similar trend for enrollment in AP courses and the number of attempted AP credits. 
Attempted AP credits are significantly lower for Promise-eligible students in the 2003–04 pre-Promise year 
compared to the 2004–05 year. On one hand, this suggests that if we compared post-Promise AP credits for 
Promise-eligible students in 2006–07 with the 2003–04 year, rather than the 2004–05 year, the Promise effect might 
appear more significant. On the other hand, these results suggest that even in the pre-Promise period, there might 
have been some differential trends in AP enrollment among different Promise eligibility groups. For example, 
perhaps there were attempts to expand AP enrollment that particularly affected long-time KPS students versus 
newcomers. This therefore raises doubts about the post-Promise results for this variable. However, for the other 
variables, there are no significant differences between Promise-eligible groups versus ineligible groups across the 
two pre-Promise years. 
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the overall effect on days suspended is at least in part due to effects on the likelihood of being 
suspended.14  
For detention, the pattern is different; the probability of being assigned detention at 
school appears not to have been affected. Hence, it is likely that the overall effect on days spent 
in detention is likely to be driven by the intensive margin.  
Robustness Checks 
Figure 7 shows some robustness checks: it shows the point estimates for probability of 
earning any credits and days spent in suspension for a reduced sample. We focus on these two 
outcome variables, as 1) we deem them not to display pre-Promise trends, and 2) the post-
Promise point estimates were significantly different from zero, at least at the 10 percent 
significance level.  
This restricted sample drops all the students who entered 10th–12th grade in KPS after 
the Promise was announced in November 2005. (We already excluded 9th graders who came 
after the Promise, as they would be eligible for Promise benefits, which might differentially 
affect in-migration. However, we previously included 10th–12th graders who came after the 
Promise announcement, as they are ineligible for Promise benefits.) This reduced sample also 
excludes those who had a change in their benefit (dropped out and reenrolled, for example) in 
2005–06 or later. In sum, 1,037 observations are dropped. Who are the students in this zero 
eligibility group?  
                                                 
14 We do not model the analogous effect along the intensive margin due to the usual issues with regressions 
conditioning on the positive value of the outcome variable (see Angrist and Pischke [2010, Chapter 3]). In order to 
get an idea how much of this effect is due to the intensive margin, we conduct the following back-of-the-envelope 
calculation. When differentiating the equation E(y|x) = E(y|x,y > 0)Pr(y > 0|x) with respect to x, we obtain that the 





𝑃𝑟(𝑦 > 0|𝑥) + 𝜕𝑃𝑟(𝑦>0|𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
𝐸(𝑦|𝑥,𝑦 > 0). Plugging in sample means and regression effects from 
columns (2) and (4) of Table 6,  for the school year 2007–08, we can back out the conditional effect on suspension 
equal to a reduction in less than six days in suspension. 
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• Students who enrolled in KPS in 2005 in their 9th grade year after the state fall 
count date or did not stay throughout the whole school year. Thus, the first year 
“countable” toward the Promise for them was when they were 10th graders and 
that makes them ineligible.  
•  Students who enrolled as 10th graders in 2005—these students will not get any 
benefit even if they came before November 10 because they were not in KPS as 
9th graders. 
The main effects of moving to this reduced sample are twofold. First, the estimated 
effects of the Promise on the dummy for credits earned lose some precision; it is now only 
statistically different from zero at a 16.4 percent level. Second, the effect is still positive and of 
important size: a 9 percentage point increase in the probability of earning credits.  
The lower panel for Figure 8 shows the effect on days spent in suspension. This effect is 
still statistically different from zero, though the point estimates are a bit smaller in absolute 
magnitude: in 2007–08, the decrease in days spent in suspension is 1.55.  
We also considered specifications in which we dropped all newly enrolled 9th graders for 
all years. We wanted to make sure that our baseline results were not driven by our decision to 
only drop newly enrolled 9th graders after the Promise announcement. We found that dropping 
all newly enrolled 9th graders for all years did not significantly change any of our results.   
Analysis by Subsamples  
Previous research studying effects of educational interventions often finds heterogeneous 
responses for boys and girls and by race/ethnicity. The economically and racially diverse nature 
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of KPS allows us to analyze student outcomes by race.15 Specifically, in Figure 8 we focus on 
African American students and impose the same sample restrictions as used in the robustness 
analysis in Figure 7. This subsample consists of 6,385 observations—5,808 eligible for any 
tuition subsidy and 577 observations not eligible for anything.   
The results for African American students are striking. For black students, unlike for the 
entire sample, there do not appear to be as clear group × pre-Promise trends in GPA. Panel A 
suggests that following the Promise, GPA has increased and continued to improve for these 
Promise-eligible black students. There does not appear to be a clear pre-Promise effect in the 
school year 2003–04. The results are also very big in magnitude; for example, in the school year 
2007–08 there was an increase of 0.70 in GPA. The GPA effects traced in Figure 8 translate to a 
0.174σ increase in the school year 2005–06, followed by a 0.280σ increase in 2006–07, and an 
enormous 0.63σ increase in 2007–08. One might wonder why these difference-in-differences 
point estimates keep trending up following the Promise as opposed to observing a one-time 
increase in GPA, which remains at a steady level past that. We would expect to find such a 
continuing increase if following the Promise there are synergies cross mapping into higher 
performance, for example higher effort and performance in one school year could lead to still 
higher performance the next school year.   
Panels C and D show the impact on days in suspension and detention. On average, the 
point estimate for black students implies a decrease of two days in suspension in the first full 
post-Promise year and a three-day decrease in 2007–08. Note that the effect on the number of 
days in detention is not precisely estimated.  
                                                 
15 We also conducted separate regressions for boys but did not find the response different from the rest of 
the sample.  
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For African American students there is a contemporaneous change in the effect the 
Promise has on days spent in suspension and GPA that we do not observe for the overall sample. 
On average, these students have a lower GPA and more days spent in suspension than their white 
counterparts. We can only speculate whether this decrease in the days spent in suspension might 
have shifted past some “tipping point” beyond which more presence in the classroom leads to 
higher grades, while leaving the white students unaffected.  
Discussion 
Overall, we believe the results suggest that the Kalamazoo Promise did have some 
differential effects on student achievement and behavior even in the first full post-Promise year, 
which is 2006–07. These differential effects on Promise-eligible students are most convincing 
for increasing the probability of earning any credits and for reducing out-of-school 
suspensions—and, mainly for the African American students, for an increase in GPA.  There is 
less convincing evidence that the Promise may have increased GPA in the full sample.  
Our results relate directly to the body of work trying to understand the incentives in urban 
education. In his work on incentivizing students in urban schools, Fryer (2011) concludes that, in 
general, paying for inputs tends to give better results than conditioning rewards on student 
output. These findings are consistent with students not fully understanding the education 
production mapping between inputs and achievement. Specifically, Fryer finds that rewarding 
works best when the students perceive that they can exert control over the input.  
Our findings indirectly support Fryer’s notion. It is possible that students simply do not 
know what inputs map directly into a higher GPA, but they understand that the opportunities 
given by the Promise are dependent on displaying better behavior in school. Thus, the relevant 
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margin along which the students react could be that of altering their behavior so that fewer days 
are spent in out-of-school suspension. 
If this hypothesis is correct, our findings suggest that Promise-style policies, and other 
policies focused on making higher education more affordable, may be usefully supplemented by 
helping students better understand how their behavior affects their future. Subsidies for higher 
education may make a greater difference in student achievement and behavior if students 
understand the link between their behavior and work habits and their GPA, and the link between 
their GPA and the future rewards offered by the Promise.  
CONCLUSION  
This paper uses the large change in expected college tuition costs induced by the surprise 
announcement of the Kalamazoo Promise’s tuition subsidies to estimate the Promise’s effects on 
student achievement and behavior. The structure of the Kalamazoo Promise benefit formula 
creates a quasi-experiment for evaluating the impact of the scholarship on Promise-eligible 
students. We find positive effects for credits earned and a decrease in days spent in suspension.  
Our results suggest that universal scholarships can be effective in incentivizing students 
to exert effort, by improving their behavior at school. Our results lead us to speculate about ways 
to strengthen the effects of Promise-type tuition scholarships and other policies to make 
postsecondary education more affordable. If students in urban school districts do not completely 
understand their education production function, the incentives provided by a universal 
scholarship such as the Kalamazoo Promise might lead them to react by improving their behavior 
but not necessarily by taking actions (such as doing more homework) that will directly lead to a 
higher GPA. One possible future role for school policies could be to help students better 
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understand the link between their student work effort and achievement and future returns to 
education.  
As mentioned before, our paper focuses on short-run effects in the Kalamazoo Promise.  
Promise-caused trends may have increased further in subsequent years. In addition, our paper, by 
its very necessity, can only examine individual effects of the Kalamazoo Promise. Promise 
effects that stem from changes in the school district’s atmosphere or morale or better peer effects 
cannot be estimated by our methodology. Certainly, school administrators and the Kalamazoo 
community have been trying both to help more students access the Promise and to change 
attitudes of students towards their futures.  We hope in future work to analyze these subsequent 
effects.  
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Figure 5  Estimated Effect (fixed effects) of the Kalamazoo Promise (KP) on Academic Achievement. 
 









NOTE: The Kalamazoo Promise was announced on November 10, 2005 (school year 2005–06). Panels A–C use the 
same specification as fixed effects regressions in Table 5. Dots around estimates indicate statistical significance at 
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Figure 6  Estimated Effect (fixed effects) of the Kalamazoo Promise (KP) on Student Behavior. 
 









NOTE: The Kalamazoo Promise was announced on November 10, 2005 (school year 2005–06). Panels A–D use the 
same specification as fixed effects regressions in Table 6. Dots around estimates indicate statistical significance at 
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Figure 7  Estimated Effect (fixed effects) of the Kalamazoo Promise (KP) on Outcomes. Robustness Checks for 











NOTE: The Kalamazoo Promise was announced on November 10, 2005 (school year 2005–06). In both 
specifications we drop the all the new enrollees since (and including 2005–06) and all of those who changes their 
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Figure 8  Estimated Effect (fixed effects) of the Kalamazoo Promise (KP) on Outcomes. Selected Results for the 
Subsample of African American Students Only.  
 










NOTE: The Kalamazoo Promise was announced on November 10, 2005 (school year 2005–06). This specification 
includes only African American students. Additionally, we drop the all the new enrollees since 2005–06 (including 
that year) and all of those who changes their eligibility level after and including 2005–06. This sample consists of 
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Table 1  Present Value of the Kalamazoo Promise for Graduates of KPS 







0 % $0.0 $0.0 
65% $17,818.2 $21,839.0 
70% $19,188.9 $23,518.9 
75% $20,559.5 $25,198.9 
80% $21,930.1 $26,878.8 
85% $23,300.8 $28,558.7 
90% $24,671.4 $30,238.6 
95% $26,042.0 $31,918.6 
100% $27,412.7 $33,598.5 
NOTE: We assume a 4.7 percent discount rate (we use this number from a study of parents’ discount rate for 
investing in children’s health—a proxy for quality; see Agee and Crocker [1996]); a 7 percent annual increase in 
tuition costs for four-year universities; and a 4 percent increase for community colleges. In column (1), we fix the 
probability of going to a community college at 0.45 and to a four-year university at 0.55. We base these percentages 
on enrollment numbers in 2006–07of the first cohort of Kalamazoo Promise recipients. In column (2), we change the 
probability of going to a community college to 0.3 and to a four-year university to 0.7. We assume the tuition cost of 
community colleges equal to $2,385 per year (15 credits). Within the universe of four-year universities, we assume 
that 13 percent attend the University of Michigan at an annual cost of $13,437; 21 percent attend Michigan State 
University at $12,769; and 66 percent attend Western Michigan University at $10,140. 
SOURCE: Tuition costs for community college are based on the 2011–2012 tuition costs for KVCC: 
http://www.michigancc.net/data/tuition (accessed August 17, 2012). Tuition costs for four-year universities are 
based on Michigan State Notes: http://www.senate.michigan.gov/sfa/Publications/Notes/2011Notes/ 
NotesSum11bb2.pdf (accessed August 17, 2012). 
 
 
Table 2  Trends in Kalamazoo Promise Scholarship Use 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 
KPS graduates 518 579 550 535 
Eligible for Promise 410 502 476 474 
% of graduates eligible 79 87 87 89 
Have used Promise 347 419 406 389 
% eligible who have used Promise 
 at any time 85 83 85 82 




Table 3  Promise Eligibility Summary 
Class 0% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% Grand Total % Eligible 100% 
 2006 108 45 25 17 18 16 9 40 238 518 79% 46% 
 2007 77 57 39 30 24 21 16 38 277 579 87% 48% 
 2008 74 50 15 19 16 8 23 48 297 550 87% 54% 
 2009 61 43 15 24 17 24 23 60 268 535 89% 50% 
 2010 75 74 7 23 22 17 24 59 248 549 86% 45% 
Grand Total 395 263 102 113 97 86 95 245 1328 2731 86% 49% 





Table 4  Summary Statistics: Means (standard deviations in parenthesis), Before and After the Promise, by 
Eligibility for the Promise (no benefit versus 65 percent or more) 
 
Before (2003–04–2004–05) After (2005–06—2007–08) 
 
No Benefit Benefit > 0 No Benefit Benefit > 0 
Variable 
    Demographic characteristics 
    Female 0.50 0.48 0.55 0.48 
Free/reduced price lunch 0.60 0.49 0.53 0.54 
White 0.36 0.45 0.38 0.40 
Black 0.51 0.46 0.52 0.50 
Hispanic 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.08 
Outcome variables 
    Suspended (0/1) 0.20 0.22 0.15 0.23 
Days suspended 1.12 1.73 0.89 2.13 
 
(3.39) (9.50) (3.64) (8.32) 
In detention (0/1) 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.12 
Credits earned (0/1) 0.87  0.96  0.88  0.93  
Credits earned 4.62 6.12 5.25 5.77 
 
(3.23) (2.63) (3.31) (2.77) 
GPA 1.57 2.15 1.78 2.05 
 
(1.22) (1.21) (1.27) (1.25) 
Enrolled in AP class (0/1) 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.10 
     Grade 
    Grade 9 0.19 0.40 0.06 0.36 
Grade 10 0.30 0.25 0.28 0.24 
Grade 11 0.25 0.19 0.30 0.21 
Grade 12 0.26 0.17 0.36 0.18 
     Benefit 
    Benefit = 0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Benefit = 65 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.09 
Benefit = 70 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.04 
Benefit = 75 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 
Benefit = 80+ 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.80 
     Number of observations 786 5,226 724 7,693 
NOTE: Most students taking an AP course sign up for two credits during a school year, for both the fall and spring, 
out of eight possible credits. “Days suspended” is days of out-of-school suspension during the school year. GPA 
average is computed on the 4-point scale (A=4.0, B=3.0, C=2.0, D=1.0, F=0). The number of observations is the 




Table 5  Estimated Effect of the Kalamazoo Promise on Academic Achievement 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 




Interaction terms: γt       
       
2003–04 × Benefit > 0 0.0779 −0.0675 0.812*** 0.172 0.0492** −0.00978 
 (0.964) (−0.913) (3.707) (0.681) (2.099) (−0.331) 
2004–05 × Benefit > 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
       
2005–06 × Benefit > 0 0.0450 0.0584 −0.239 −0.284 0.00243 −0.00987 
 (0.496) (0.750) (−0.955) (−1.083) (0.0998) (−0.436) 
2006–07 × Benefit > 0 −0.159 0.133 −0.437 −0.0830 −0.00278 0.0331 
 (−1.428) (1.315) (−1.418) (−-0.246) (−-0.0880) (0.949) 
2007–08 × Benefit > 0 −0.330** 0.205 −0.466 0.587 −0.000759 0.0879* 
 (−2.526) (1.274) (−1.278) (1.293) (−0.0197) (1.819) 
Constant 2.042*** 2.075*** 4.637*** 5.514*** 0.860*** 0.879*** 
 (18.87) (102.7) (20.36) (83.44) (40.18) (111.8) 
       
Observations (NT) 14,429 14,429 14,429 14,429 14,429 14,429 
Observations (N)  6,618  6,618  6,618 
R-squared 0.298 0.019 0.196 0.044 0.059 0.077 
       
Effect size 2005–06 0.0354 0.0459 −0.0861 −0.103 0.0103 −0.0418 
Effect size 2006–07 −0.125 0.104 −0.158 −0.0300 −0.0118 0.140 
Effect size 2007–08 −0.259 0.161 −0.168 0.212 −0.00322 0.373 
NOTE: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions include the following controls: female, free and reduced price lunch, 
white, black, Hispanic, grade level (9–12), indicator for whether the student is new enrollee, an indicator for whether the student has had a change in the 
eligibility level over time, and a full set of interactions between school years (2003–04, 2005–06, 2006–07, and 2007–08) and Promise eligibility dummy 
(Benefit > 0) For the regressors of interest, the benchmark category is the school year 2004–05 and eligibility level equal to zero. Hence, for the positive 
eligibility level, the estimate is the difference in the outcome variable over time (from 2004–05 to 2007–08) relative to the same change in the zero eligibility 
group (control). The effect size is calculated by dividing the coefficient from the each regression by the standard deviation of dependent variable in the control 
year (school year 2004–05). Universe: Students enrolled in KPS in grades 9–12 during school years 2003–04 through 2007–08 subject to sample restrictions, see 






Table 6  Estimated Effect of the Kalamazoo Promise on Student Behavior 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

















Interaction terms: γt         
         
2003–04 × Benefit > 0 0.00894 0.00950 −0.134 −0.0117 0.0259 −0.00258 0.0613 0.0825 
 (0.313) (0.226) (−0.396) (−0.0277) (1.342) (−0.0917) (1.026) (0.873) 
2004–05 × Benefit > 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
         
2005–06 × Benefit > 0 0.00786 −0.00969 0.369 −0.357 −0.00712 −0.0157 0.0466 −0.0411 
 (0.260) (−0.253) (0.914) (−0.796) (−0.298) (−0.521) (0.593) (−0.370) 
2006–07 × Benefit > 0 0.0249 −0.0215 −0.115 −1.296** 0.0542** 0.00936 0.0933 −0.0671 
 (0.693) (−0.427) (−0.235) (−2.396) (2.147) (0.252) (1.218) (−0.588) 
2007–08 × Benefit > 0 0.0378 −0.0579 −0.502 −1.796*** −0.00185 −0.0207 −0.0687 −0.179 
 (1.034) (−0.924) (−1.036) (−2.833) (−0.0675) (−0.468) (−0.938) (−1.379) 
Constant 0.207*** 0.210*** 1.772*** 1.521*** 0.122*** 0.106*** 0.245*** 0.197*** 
 (6.876) (18.09) (5.040) (4.218) (5.798) (11.38) (4.470) (4.888) 
         
Observations (NT) 14,429 14,429 14,429 14,429 14,429 14,429 14,429 14,429 
Observations (N)  6,618  6,618  6,618  6,618 
R-squared 0.149 0.056 0.047 0.023 0.090 0.042 0.056 0.037 
         
Effect size 2005–06 0.0187 −0.0230 0.0310 −0.0301 −0.0231 −0.0509 0.0426 −0.0376 
Effect size 2006–07 0.0593 −0.0510 −0.00965 −0.109 0.176 0.0304 0.0853 −0.0613 
Effect size 2007–08 0.0899 −0.138 −0.0423 −0.151 −0.00602 −0.0671 −0.0628 −0.164 
NOTE: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Same as in Table 5. Universe: Students enrolled in KPS in grades 9–12 during school years 2003–04 through 2007–08 subject to sample restrictions, see the text 
for details.  
SOURCE: KPS. 
